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An Introduction To Tax Shelter Analysis
Since H1(: de v s of Pre--Soeriltic Ph l I o s onb cr s such as Pyt.tldgoras a nd
Her-ael itus of Eph(,SIlS, man has tried to impr-ove his social and c co nom t c
I (J t • rJl '2 t h ink i n rJ D f 1.h 0 sea nc i ('n t s c hoi drs V/'1 S d i r 0. c ted t 0\" ar don ('
ultimate gOill-·--ttlilt w a s to learn l1\iihat Is." Th(~se two \'/ords r c pr e s o n tvd
the irs (ld r Ch for t r ut h i nth e soc i a I, sci ()n t if i can d no I i 9 i 0 use IlV i r 0 fIIne11t S •
ov e r the c e n t uri e s I1V:111 h d S mil dec 0 n s tan t C) Cl ins i n Ii i S Ci" C1r c h f D r t rut h
in all of these ;Jl-eilS----ho'>'lever, 11(> s t l II ne s a lor19 ro o d to l re v er s c ,
From tho Early dclYS uf ba r t e r, society has paved its I'lay by some form of
economic system.
/I popular I!?qrnd has c o l t e d /\dam Smith the Father- of Po I l t l c a l
economy. His two 9n',ll: b()()kS---Ihc __:rl1_(>:..o_u o__f_J'!l:l!aL.?_s__r~_t_i_n!_e_I1_ts.t first
pub I I s hv d in 17'S9, il nd 0_r~__I_rl_ql}_i!_y__ 1_fl_1g_1;__h_f't~ilJ:y_r_(>c:3_1}(j __ ~~~__\L?_e_s___[)f_~tb!~
~_~a_I_\_l:l__Q_f __~'~.li_(UJ.~, first pI)bl ish(~d in I 776----ilr,> epllctl--In;ll{lnq in economic
history ilS VJ?l I 0:; in the ('volut.inn of e(_~llnomic thought.
i1nottll?r pion",e!'- in socio---econornlcs \rliJS I\'lt-I l'ltlrx., Iv'(lrx dnd Ilis
coll()il~Fje, Friedrich Eng;>ls. presented thrir thouC]11tS ami pll\losophi05. In
the _~_[J!ll]]_~\J_rl_i_'2!.__ t-1.l_~l_i_f_c_,,_\_o_, pub I i shed in 184D. L(lt er. H,lI-X r I aboral rd his
vie'",s in his _g_il__:s__ I{_<J_[.l~LtCl_L. rhe above-mentioned duthot-s wer,' dialTletr-iciJlly
opposed ilS to tiH'ir- ecn[)OInic beliefs. I\d;-lill ;:-)ll1ith p\lqlDrted ttldt wealth
\,1a sap nJ d II C t 0 f s pee i oj I i Vl t ion. IIi h i I e Md r x he I d t hat we ,3 I t h Vi a sap rod -
uct of lahor, and ttlereby belonged to the laboring class.
2These two diverse phi losophies have contributed to innumerable
political and social revolutions over the years. Today, society is
5ti I I tugging at the portals of knowledge in order to better refine
the "What Is" in the environmental framework of economic thought.
The economic theories of Adam Smith were based upon the principle of
I a iss e z - f air e , t I, e let -a Ion e p r inc ipie, w h ic h rep res e nted a fun dam e n ta I I Y
uncontrolled productive and distributive market, driven by self-interest
and coordinated by competition. He bel ieved that the uninhibited operation
of this principle would e s t e b l i sh the market price at a competitive
level in concert with the supply and demand for goods at a given point
of e qui lib r I um ,
Unfortunately, or more appropriately fortunately, we do not live
within the theoretical vacuum of Adam Smith's perfect competition.
Other things come into play that create weights and balances against
the operation or attainment of so-called "pe r t ec t competition." These
consist of many factors, none the least are labor laws, anti-trust laws,
and the whole spectrum of federal income taxes. This paper is directed
toward the discussion of income taxes and their impact upon the socio-
economic structure in which we I ive today.
Before delving into the complexities of federal income tax, tax
shelters, and their impact upon the economy--be it positive or
negative--it would seem proper to discuss the history of income
taxes from early European times to the present day.
The incorne tax played, '<lith re r e exceptions, an i n s i qn i f i c c n t role
in the Middle Ages. For a long period of time taxation was of minor
importance when compared with other sources of publ ic revenue. Income
was derived largely from the lucrative prerogatives of the feudal
lord. When taxation did develop, it consisted largely of assessments
3on vclrious types of trade and transportation; when direct taxation
began it took the form of a general proper-ty tax. (14, 41)
It is pertinent to recall some points in the history of the property
tax so far as they have bearing upon the present discussion. First,
under the feudal system real estate was rarely bought and sold--the only
practical method of ascertaining the value of the land was by account-
ing for its rents. As it pertained to real estate, the earliest tax was
assessed on produce rather than on sales value. When taxing methods be-
came more sophist icated, the tax was assessed on the sales value of the
land, such value being determined by the co p i t a l i za t i on of t h e rents.
Secondly. all movables or items of personal property were assessed at
the sales level so that the tax bccame a c cmb i ne t i o n of a tax on produce
and on sell ing ve luc , In the third place, salaries and wages were con-
sidered to possess some taxable e b i I i t y , even if the taxpayer he d no prop-
erty. As the result of thiS, we frequently find an assessment on individ-
uals in some proportion to their gains. This can be compared to the
present-day pol icy of "net worthing" when an accurate accounting cannot
be determined as a basis of taxation. No important professions existed
for a long period of time during the Middle Ages. This meant that the
day laborer bore the blunt of the tax. As for the salaries of state
officials, the same methods were often followed as in the case of real
estate--such salaries were reduced to a capital sum for tax purposes.
Finally, as commerce developed and the gains of the businessman could
not be approximated from invested capital, we often find a tax assessed
upon the assumed profits of his business in the form of an income tax.
( 14 }41 )
In sumrner y , the rned i e va l tax system was I i t t le more than a general
property tax. The greatest amount of revenue came from the t e xe t i on
4of p cr s o ne : pr o per t y and r ee t c s t o t e ; h owe vc r , t h i s was occasionally
supplemented by a tax on the faculties of tile laboring class and on the
assumed faculties of tile businessman. en occasion we find, in addit ion
to t n e general property tax and at t r rncs a part of it, a personal tax.
Til i s was e I the r i nth r~ f 0 nn 0 f a pol lor Cd pit d t ion t a x , 'dh i c h 'da s de_
signed to assess certain classes whose gains 'dere not entirely in pro-
po r t ion tot h e i r pro peo t y • ( I 4, 42)
The taxing policies of England had no smell I i mpe c t upon the tax
structures as they were developed in early America. In view of their
i rnpor t e nc e in t h i s area, it s e crns advisable to diSCUSS some of these
policies in brief.
After Fr~nce declared war against England in 1793, new tax laws
were enacted, and additional telxes were laid from year to yedr. Revi-
sions were made to customs, excises, rind stamp duties. Cc r t e i n new
duties w er e imposed on tea, stone, salt, and on collateral succession.
Some assessed t a x e s had been i nc r ee sed by 10 percent in 1796, and e qa i n
in 1797. The taxable property WdS extended from carriages, servants, and
h 0 r s est 0 Inc l ud e ha I r pow de r , d [J g s, wa t c h e s , d nd c I 0 c I< s • ( I 4, 60 -6 I )
These changes proved to be inadequate to cover the expenses of the
confl i c t , and tile French victories had an adverse effect upon Br t t i s h
credit. By 1796 the situation had reached such alarming proportions
that the nQtional leaders 'dere driven to numerous and varied schemes
for fiscal s t a b i I ity. Althougl-l there had been an increase in HH~
ass e sse d t a xes, rn0 s t oft her eve nu e cam e fro m c x pend i t u res r a ttl er t 11a n
possessions. This lead to a direct attacl< upon the wealth of the individ-
uals by s orne direct as s e s srnen t . One writer tried to bolster confidence
by s uqq e s t i nq a "general and vo t un t ar y contribution." Bowles, a member
of Pe r t i amcn t , c o l t e d it a "Public Contribution to be furnished by the
general mass of proprietors"---he made it fairly plain t hu t the yield was
expected to come pr irno r i Ly from the wealthy class of people. The scheme
was not adopted; however, d year later he stated thdt due to what he
called the "inflexible obstinacy and i ncr ee s ed mal ignity of the Opposition"
f u nd s were at their low ebb. (14, 60-61)
An o t h e r writer of the day, H.A. London, went so f ar: as to advocate a
progressive pr o p er t y tax. He stated, "Taxes should affect individuals in
a p,ogressive ratio, proportionate to their properties, for they who
he v e the gredtest interest e t stake should beiJi- the qr eo t e s t c nar q e ;"
Th i s ScllTle e u t no r was also willing to augment his proposed e s s e s i.men t by
indirect taxes on luxuries. He stated they were the "properest objects
for t e xet i o n in time of war." (14 61-62)
A work written in 1820 was d e s i qn ed to pr o v e that "the present
fiscal system compels the t ab our e r , a dwarf In w ea lt h , to carry the load
of the lord, who is a giant in e tt t ue nc e ;" It implored the government to
"express the taxes out of tile accumulated wealth of the country, and not
out of the blood and sinews and bones of a devoted and indefatigable
people." (14, II?)
The British r nc orne tax, wh i c n we s adopted t-lay 31,1842, w c n t on
It became the basis for future mod-
ificatiuns of the British levy on income. Extreme opposition to taxes
was evident from d s t et cme nt of the day expressing the t h o u qh t that,
notwithstanding the reduction of expenditures as the result of a peace-
time footing, t h e repeal of the former war-time income tax left a deficit
in the revenues which necessitdted the imposition of new taxes. Even
pr i o r to t h e above--mentioned period, resentment against t e xc s was at a
high point. The situation as it e x r s t e d in 1820 was described by a
writing in the "Ld i nbur qh Re v i cw" of tiled same year. It described the
tax load as consisting of assessments on food for eating, fuel for heat-
ing, I ight, and locomotion. There existed taxes on imports, exports,
raw materials for manufacturing, drugs for medicinal purposes, texti les
for c lot h i n g, toy s for ell i I d r en, and f i na I I Y a t a x 0 n a rnan "s est ate
after he dies. (14, Ill) The above s t e t eme n t s could well be taken from
the e d ito r I a I p age 0 f a cur r e n tis sue 0 f Ih e_ ~ S t r e~~_ .:dQ.urn a I •
The /\ct of 1842 was po pu l ar Iy called tile Property and Incorne Tax
It was, for all intents and purposes, a reprint of the law of
1806. (14. 132)
The above discussion is not set forth to belabor the reader, but
to emphasize the fact that the tax laws of England in t b e late 1700ls
and e e r l y 180Uls w e re to some degree instrumental in determining the
tax structure of early America.
B. Growth of l nc orne Taxes in the United States.
Itlith the exception of an early poll tax in Virginia, the first gener-al
tax law in the ;\rnerlcan colonies was the law of 1634 in t--\assachusetts Bay.
The law provided for the assessment of e o cn man "according to his estate
and with consideration of all OtrH?I his aiJilityes whatsoever." It is
probable that the rne a s ur e of this abi I ity was to be found in property;
for, although the law itself does not further explain the term, the matter
is c l u c i do t e d in a provision of t h c next year, t ha t "all men shall be
rDtedfDr t h e i r whole e b i I i t i c , wh er e s o e v e r it I i e s ," This seems to imply
only viSible property; for such property alone is susceptible of a situs.
Several y e e r s later !labi I i t y " wa s defined to Include s orne t h i ng more
than property. This occurred in the colony of New Plymouth. In the
year 1643 assessors were a pp o i n t e d to rate all the i nhab i t a nt s of that
7colony according to the estates or faculties~ that is, according to
goods, lands, impr o ve d faculties, e nd personal abilities. (14,367-368)
This law is noteworthy for two reasons, it is the first time the term
"facultyll had been used, and it distinguished faculty and personal
ability from visible property. Although it provided for (] faculty tax,
it did not tel I us exactly how this faculty should be measured. This
was reserved for a more comprehensive law enacted three years later by
the Court of Assistants of the Massachusetts Bay Company. A court order
of 1646 provided not only for the assessment of personal and real
est ate s , but men t Ion ed' , I abo r er s , d r t i f ice r sand han o i c r aft smen' , as
subject to taxation. It f ur t h er provided that ski lied persons in the
art san d t r ad e s are morea b let 0 he I p be art he pub I i c bur den t han are
the convnon laborers and workmen. (14, 368)
It is here for the first time that we observe a deflriition of
"faculty" or "abil i t y ,." The above sets out the faculty of the property
owner in the produce of his c s t e t e versus that of "artists" and
"tradesmen" in the returns and gains of their estates. The property
val u e 0 fan est ate was a ppro x i rnatel y equa Ito the c iJ pit a liz ed v il I u e 0 f
the yearly p,oduce. In this manner the faculty of the property owner
could be measured by the value of the property. \~here no pr op er t y
existed, the assessors had to rely on "returns and gains." (14, 369-3l0)
The above-mentioned principle as laid down by the Hassachusetts
Bay colony was Soon after adopted by other colonies. As an example,
the colony of New Haven first levied a tax on land. In 1640 personal
property was assessed by the provision that a new rate should be
"estreeted, halfe upon estates, halfe upon l e nd s ;!' ( 14, 369-370)
La t er , laws in Connecticut, Plymouth, Rhode Island, and others were
Ly _
( 1r1, :16 9-1 70 )
expected f rorn the l o y a t states being pill at :1;20 m i II ion. (14, 1130-il31) , '
forerunner of o ur pres('nt-dclY t a x , h o s a l wa y s ar o u s o d s t r o riq passions
Dtwinq the Civil 'i/ar it WClS rv t u nr. t a n t l v pr e s e nr ed to Co n qr e s s as (]
~lfJ\lernrTlent .:
(1n July 4, 1(361 S!?creli'Jry Chase suqn e s t cd that a srna l l pur t io n-v-
not toe x c r? edt? 0 rn i I I i I) n -----0 f t h (' r e qui t- ed r e 'lien ue b'2 t- iJ i s (' d by ITIea n s
of d i r e rt taxes 01- internal duties 0'- e xc i se s , or both. Fo l J uw l nq his
su qu e st ion, stevens, t h e chair-man of the Curmnitte(J of 'dJys iJnrJ H"cl!15
i n t r o rtu c o d a hill providing for direct t a x n t l o n and certain i nt e r na l
d u t :es. It was est irna t e d to provide revenue of '\:30 rni II ion; the quo t e s
"
In In62 l e q l s t o t i o n \'J3S finally fF1s:;ed consisting of i1 comp-- "I ", "
r r. ~ )1 I
::: ~" j
" I
I"
r p h (' n s i v '" cod e 0 fin t (' r n i:l I 1-f' V (' n Ue t iJ Xe s , o f w h i c h t IH' inc 0 r nf' cI tJ l Y
f 0 I'[n (' don I yap d r- t • A s r r i e s () f t cl X f! 50 W (J r () I e vie d fJ nth e Q r-n s s ,- (' C (' i Pt s
of (2(tain (orporations, all railroads \,/Crf' re(luiled to withhold Cln1 to
pay OVI"I" to the govPt-nm(lnt three pel-cent on trle inter-est of their bonds
and divid"r-usof theil- stock. All banks, trust companies, savirHJs
institutions, and instlt-anee companies \vel-e to pay a duty of thr-el'
percent on diVidendS, and on assessments added to their surplus or
( 0 n tin 9 e n t fun d s • Sa I n r i e S 0 f g 0 ve r nrrH' n t 0 f f i cia I s w e r- e t il xed a t the
,-ate of three pel-cent on incollH' in excess of six-hundr-ed dollars.
(14, 437--43:'3)
~age earners of this modern day tend to think that the with-
holding of income taxes from their regular salary checks to be a
cornpardtively nevi inrtovidion. This is not t-he CJsr,. Durinq the pel-iod
of time under- discussion, the technique of withholding was utilized.
9Government disbursing officers ~nd paymasters were re~uired to with-
hold t h e tax at t nc time of the payment of tile salary. The "income
duty" property consisted of a tax of three percent upon "the annual
9 a ins, pro fit S 0 r inc 0 Ine s 0 fan y p e r son res I din gin the Un I ted S tat e s ,
whether derived f ro ,n any kind of property, rents, interest, dividend,
se l e r i e s or f r om any profession, trade, employment or vocation carried
on in the United States or elsewhere, or from any source whatever,"
if such income exceeded $600. If the above-mentioned income exceeded
~pIO,OOO, tile rate was fixed at five percent. Citizens l l v i uq abroad
we rea Iso t a xed a t the r d teo f f i ve per c e n t • Inc 0 III e fro m ~l0 v e r nmen t
bonds was asses~ed at the rate of one and one-half percent. In
computing the annual gains, profits, or income subject to tax, deduc-
t ion s we rea I I 0\" e d for a I lot h e rna t ion a I, s t iJ t e , il nd I 0 C iJ I t a xes
ass e sse d u po nth e pro per t y 0 r so lJ r ceo f i nco 11lE', a s wei I a s for a I I
r nc o.ne s tdxable under t h e sections of the law. (14, 437-43B)
In summary, the Law of 1864 pr o v i o e d for Income duty at five
percent in excess of :p600 up to ;p5,OOO; seven and one--ila I f percent in
excess of :\;5,000 lip to :~IO,OOO, and 10 percent of amounts over
t 10.,000. Institutions such as banks, trust companies, savings be nk s , and
ins u r d n Ce COl npan i e s 'vJ ere t a xed at f I v e per cent 0 nth e i r d i v ide n d san d
interest on bonds, the amo u nt of such tax to be deducted from the sums
due to the security holders. Sales were tdxed at five percent of amounts
over :~60U. (14,4..:14)
There was conSiderable contest over the retention of the tax and
after much debate in the House and Senate--tlle income tax was allowed
to die a natural death and expired by l trn i t ct i o n in 1872. (14, 444)
Fo r approxirnately two decades tile income tax was not a serious political
10
issup" I \ i:; j r u r\ h :.1 j' t 11,' r;(1 C i :1 I i ~.t I'') r t y i) n d c (' r t ,I in, I q t ,! r i;) n f] I Ii II I: :;
lIk1dC' rlPlllllids for :1 prrl'lres:;iv(J--lYIIP of income t o x ; tIOI'ICVr'I-, tile: f_]pncrill
nru s p o r jt y o f t h c nidion [JUt inq til" e i qht i c s pr e v en t co these sectors f r orn
'-1'1 V i n q ;1 ;:; tr D n CJ i nflu ('nr (J • ((), n)
IJlJtlnrlthe lUCiO's /lind t i rne s dese'?ndei1 up(Jn thl' \fr~';trnl Wllc"t
f dill e r S d n Ii :_;0 IJ t h (.'r n r; [) t ton p l o n t r~r S • /\ [D n f lie t h (' t \'I f.' e nth e q r ();,1t
indust'-iiJl/findncial centers w i t h t.l1(' VI(.':_;t and '30utll qencr;JteJ i nr r e a s c d
pressure for t h c incolilc tax. revenue of th(;' inuiviclu(]1 states and IDcal
governl!lents depcndpd he,]v; Iy OIl the pr-npcrty ta)c. These funds, of
C()IJt-SC" W21~e cOlnirJel froll) fanner-:; clncl (ltIH~r~s in t'Ut-,ll cOlTllnunitil-cs; vJherCils,
the 'il e a I t Iilin v C' S tor s, the bus i fIE' sse 0 lOrn U 11 i t y, a 11d the jJ I' a f (' S s i Cl rlCl I
p e 0 p,l e vi ere be cl r- j n 9 lit tie 0 f the til X b II r-den. (6, [3--9)
The' D;)fI1nct-(1tic presidential victory of 1[J9;! vns in [I;:lrt a result of
puhl ie sentiPl(.'nt':llF1in';t thl) ili1[Jvr"I'lCntioIlCO tdX inequal iticc-, ilnd inju',;-
'-
tiees. Prpsident Clpv(!lilno's rl1-opDsillror- all inCDllle t;n in l~l9l 'dCflc"--
dted oJ :donn of protests. <:ier]iJtor John ShCtrlJdn stated: "111 iJ rf'publ ie
like our-s, villcle '111 liIen iHe r.)'lUi'lI, this attempt to c1t-I~ay t11(.' rich iJ-
galnst till' poor- 01- PIC POIJr il~Flinst the rich is socialism, cmnrnunisrn ?Ind
devilisln."
~;tclted: f! 111<:) fJ iJ ,; s ,J g e D f t tt (.' b i" will [lFlt' k t IJ[.' d il\1 n [l f a tn i fll'd to r rJ IY ,
vlith 11101'-1' sunshine, rIC1l(' of the songs of bi,-ds. more of thiJt S'dl"etpst
music, tilc l(luc]11tf'l- pf chi Idr-on "'I'll fed, wrll clothed, \'lrll hllusrd ••• "
Go cI Iiil ,; t I:' n til \' e r-d 0 f (' q U ,J lit Y i f1 t <J X d t i [)n Clndin 0 Pil0 r tun i t Y • " (6, 10)
/\n incolile t'JX ",as levi{)d at tl1I' I-atl' of two percent on incomes over-
t4,OOO; hovo/ever, the predictions of neither ;)(..'n(ltor Sh(..'rrnan nor
Cong,-essl1'10rJ ()e/lrillOnd '",ere r"al i2.·cd-·-the Supreme Court. held tile taY 'to tH'
I I
l e vv Viele; ,'I "direct" ln x ; ~;'ICtl il tax CQuid not be iflljlo~~c>d ufFin' the
Co nst i t u t i o n without tl)(> pr o v i si o n fOI e p pnr t i o runcn t accnnJing to the
pOjlulation of ttle states. (6,9) The Sixtr):!nl:tl !'.l1wndrnrnl: to tfH'
Co n s t i t u+i o n , ratified in 1913, l}lVI? Conqres:; tile p()I.vcr to a s s c ss tax cs
on incDlfll':;; f r nm who t e v cr so urc e w it ho ut a pp or t f o nrnc nt amo n q 1. he "PVfTc1I
s t ot c s , und without n'CFHcj to any c e nsu s o r c numc r a t i c n ,
In r o t ro s n e r t the Civi I \j;lr Income Ta x had marry s hu rt r om l n o s . It
had rn i s t.rk c s of theory, the principle of stDprage-,at'-'SDurce 'NilS not
widely used. Secondly, the law co taincd mistakes of principle 0nd was
con f u s (' din 'J iJ r i 0 US 0 f i t s p?-1r t s • Til i r d I y, the e x PIli p t i o n s v! P1-t> t II II
h i gil. Til e h i lJhex ern p t ion s , p a r:tic II I ,J r I Y t 110 s e r p s u I tin 9 f r Um the d nIf! II cJ-'
me n+ of If370~ not only cur t o t t cd re v cn uc , but o p en ed t h c duor t nr e va s i o n
q i v c s iJ t'()SUIW:' n] c o t l c c t i o ns fot U1e ye,1t'" 1,'16:3 t h- o unh If177.(I/l, !\l~)--/I·P,1
Til I' i II ( 0 III () t c.lX D f I ,59 ,\., ',I hie 11 Vi () S til (' S II h j (' C t I) f Ii1II C h rJ (' h, 1 t (', '11/1S
tD be follol<ved by the t;l)( I('vy of 1913. The levy conslst('rJ of (J one 111't
cent nDnni.l1 tax on all inCf.lIIWS above [Jet-SOrti)I l'yel~lfJtilJns of!A,OOO fnr rll,lr·-
t-i"d p()rsons 0tld 'i:,3,OOO for singl~' persolls. ;\ ';urti'j)( bCgdr. (1t niH> prr-'
CPllt 011 incomes of '(,20,000 to :!.sO,OOO ilnd rlJSf' to a top rill,! of six pcr-
cent on j nCllrnes over 'j)5ClU,OOO. (I), I')
No 9 ,- (' i:1 t c han rJ {' :; t u cd( P I a e l' i II tt~(' inc CiI;)lO t il X s t rue t u r f' LJ n til
/\rrH!ricCl cntC'.red \IDrlci \':ar I. IndrocrJ, to a v('ry I'H~le extent, illi Ii t,]ry
cOldl iets tell tile stol'y of the gidllt ,;tcps in OUI' incol11<:' teJX. It ",HS
bot-n in the Civil \,'ar, it first rcached the levels of a steeply grddlJdted
levy in \/orlrJ\'/c11- I i:lne! it 1t.l(JS r'cvDlutionized in \llor-ld vlar II. II,JclVY
wart imc budg('ts, inflot ion and ('xp(';ndecJ publ ie s(>rvicrs are at thr) roots
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of ttw history of the inc ome tax. (6,11-12)
f3)' the c los e 0 f YI(1 rid 'vi a r I, per son die xem p t ion s had her n r (? d u( edt a
$2,000 for married persons and family heads and to $1,000 for single
persons. Surtax rates had attained a high of 65 percent on incomes over
tIOO.OOO. In spite of this, a man with two dependents having an income
of :j:25,OOO pair! only :j;;~~WiO In tax; and only five and onp··llalf million
r c t ur ns wer"filed out of a population of 106 million p eo p l e , (6~ 11·..12)
In 1921, i.l war-weary nation. which was experiencing declining pr o..
d uct i 0 11 \'i h i let h e c I) S t 0 f 1 i v i n 9 was s til I r i sin g. e 1H t \'d Wa rr enG. Ha r din 9
to the wn i t e House e l n nq w it h a r~epuhl i ce n Congress to back him.
Andrew vt : Hellon, r o n s i d c r e d by some people at the time as the qr e a t e s t
Sec;-etiny of the Treasury since /vl e xe nrie r Hamilton, immediately established
a progrum to cut Income taxes. particularly at the higher levels. Ry
192f3, the top SU, .. t a x rates had be en reduced from a wart ime l1igb of
65 percent to 20 percent on incnm~s over +100,000. At the same time
exemptions for married taxpayers wrre increased to ~3,500, for a single
person to :1;1,500. w i t h a :t400, e)«~lnptlon t o r each dependent. The re-
d ur t i o n in the 1928 income tax is Indicated by the f,:lct that the tax
on a fdrni Iy of four with a '1'10,000 income had dw i n d l ed to :!;83. (6, 12)
The depression of the thirties reduced budgetary surpluses of the
hventies into deficits. The New DpJI's rnc e s ur e s 10 c ar e fa, .. the un·-
crnp l o y ed (lnd to hr o a d s n pub l ic services i ncre a s e d income taxes to some
e xte n t , wn l t e persollal exemptions WHe decreased. (6,12)
Eve n t s b r 0 ugh t (1 b()U t bY vlo r I d VI M' I I, for the m0 S t par t , r '2 v 0 Iu \ ion ..·
Ized the income t e x 'and set the s t e uc for ttH' concept as W(' know it todi.lY·
For ttlf! first time in the history of the United States, the tax Wflich had
been an exclusively r"ich·-ll1an's I idbil ity, beCil[ne a broad-basr>.d levy ex-'
tending to the general masses of the population, coupled with steep
IJ
starting rates and rapid graduation to new highs. As an example of the
aforementioned comments, seven ilnd one-half million returns were filed
in 1940 wh i Ie t n e country's population stood at 132 million. (6,13)
In 1960, 60 ml II ion returns were fi led whi Ie the country's popula-
t ion was 180 mi II ion. In 1940 t ne rates star-ted at four percent and
rose to 79 percent. In 1962 they started at 20 percent and went to
91 percent. In 1940 a married man with two children paid a tax of ~;-r5
on a :~5,000 income--in 1962 he paid $520 on the same i nc orne , In 1940
the same individual paid a tax of :1,3,570 on $25,000 income while in 1962
the tax on the same amount of income amounted to :j;6,300. At an income
level of $100,000 the 1942 tax rose from $43,000 to $52,000 in 1962. (6,13)
c. Necessity of Income Taxes and Problems of Incidence.
The necessity of income taxes and t he problems of incidence are r e-«
lated to governmental regulation and the impact of such regulation upon
the free business world in such a way that one cannot be discussed with-
out the other. Government interference was discussed by Dunbar in a
collection of Eronomic::_ Essay~_ publ i sh ed in 1904·. He expressed his senti-
ments by drawing a parallel between the problems in international and
domestic trade. He stated that in the discussion of domestic supply and
demand and of pri c e , it is a s s u.ned tho t the deal ings are free from (on--
t r o l at' influence by any superior power; also, in Hie discussion of wages
and profits. the competition of individual interest acts by itself.
But plainly, the question whether competition may be restricted by law
or by combination, or Should be free, must be answered by independent rea-
soning. Dunbar reasoned that laissez faire is no part of the structure
of the old economic doctrine. He strives to justify his sayings by
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income taxation by saying t he t the power of society is to be directed
by a keen sense of duties, scientifically defined and recognized.
Society is to consider things other than the mere enrichment of the
community. It has a duty to the laborer in that he should be treated
as something morc than a tool of capital. Finally, he stated there
can be no doubt that our sympathy with the aspirations of the laboring
class as we! I as our zeal for those things that shall bring the rnas se s
of society to a higher level of e x i s t ence in modern civilization, is and
must always be altogether foreign to the questions as to the causes
which determine wages. (3,48-<19)
The above quotations from the works of the ledrned Charles Dunbar,
(publ ished in 1904 by the late Professor of Pol it ical Economy in Harvard
University) are reiterated here not to inject a complete new subject
into this work, but to review the proposition that the re$ults of gov-
ernmental regulation, interference, etc., by legislative or other means
are inherent within our society via the route of taxation--and very pre-
dominately by that type of assessment pertaining to the incomes of indi-
viduals and business enterprises, be such enterprises single proprietor-
ships, partnerships, or corporations.
As we discuss the necessity of income taxes and their impact upon
the society via the route of governmental regulations, controls, and re-
straints, so we must also discuss the incidence of these levies. If
the rei s to be an eve I'- 9I'ow in gsa cia 1st I'U c t uI'e, be it n ec e s sa I'yoI' not,
that is to a larger degree supported by assessments upon the incomes of
its components~ then inquiry must be made as to the equity of such as-
sessments. As alluded to in the foregoing pe r e qr a ph s , this question is
one of long standing--alas, one that has haunted governmental entities--
be they presidents, legislative bodies, dictators, emporers, and
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kings--for centuries. The Holy Scriptures give us some insight into
the procedures of tax collection by the Roman Empire. The Roman ad-
ministrdtion collected taxes of various kinds from the inhabitants of
Palestine. Water, meat, and salt were subject to taxation. There was
also a road tax, a city tax, a house tax, as well as a poll tax. (Book
a f !via r k , 2. 13-1 7)
In modern times the equity of taxation starts with the rate schedule
and seems to wander ad infinitum through deductions, exemptions, etc.
Hellerstein, writing on the subject of tax loopholes in 1963 has called
the rate schedule the "Grand Delusion." He has stated: " ••••• the rate
schedule is a colossal delusion. Our affluent taxpayers, as a rule,
just don't pay taxes on their incomes at the high scheduled rates. And
the reason is that our tax laws ar e full of leaks, loopholes, exemptions
and preferences." If we considerthe revenues from taxes that would be
collected from upper-bracket taxpayers, if the rate schedule were actually
appl i ed to the incomes of our more affluent taxpayers, and then look at
what they really pay, we would find the c ornpe r i s nn highly illuminating.
For the year 1956, the last year for which detailed studies are available,
(at the time of that writing) the average income-tax I iabi I ity of indi-
viduals with incomes of $100,000 or more, amounted to approximately 36 per--
cent of their incomes. Yet, the tax tables call fOI- an effective rate of
approximately 67 percent appl ied to $100,000 income for an individual;
at an income level of ~200,OOO the effective rate would be about 78 per-
cent, and at the :1; 500,000 level it would be 80 percent. (6, 16)
"The tax base has leaks in it. Some income is exempt from tax by
law; some types of income are grunted preferential rates of tax; and
some classes of taxpayers are the beneficiaries of preferred rates.
I (
Finally, u ed uc t i u n s of a dubious c har e c t er e fte r t i v e l y reduce high
incolTles." (6, 11) In this vein Hellerstein goes f urt h er and mentions
a few 0 f ttl e set a x. pre fer e n C e s, s a If] e a f w 1\ i c h w i I I bed i s c U 5 sed i n
more detail later in t h i s study.
Hellerstein mentions t e x=e x empt municipal bonds. This e x ernpt i o n-c-
on income from securities i s s uc d by a state o r local qo ver nme nt c -wa s
placed into th(~ Iclw in 1913 e nd has been there ever since. (6,17) He
also refers to the pr e f e r enc e resulting from c e p i t a l gains by saying:
"The income-tax law is based on tile principle that in order to produce
e q u iJ I I t Y 0 f t a x bur den, wen ee rJ i nequa I I t yin t a x r d t e s ; t hat a s a rna n I s
income (joes up, his ability to pay taxes i ncr ee s e s , and rates o uqh t to
r is e ." (6, 18) Yet one of the deepest cuts in the actual tax I iabi I ity
of higher income taxpayers grows out of the reversal of this principle
in the c o s c of capital gdins. Profits f r o.n the sales of stocks, bonds,
real estate, a nd o t nc r properties are t e x ed at 10\'1er rates than income
generally. Obviously, the upper and middle-bracket taxpayers own tile
largest portion of the property in the country; consequently, they gen-
erate tile capital gains (and losses) by virtue of their ho l d i nq s , A
study based on net long-term capital gains (the excess of gains over
loses) of '1;307 billion repor-ted in 1957 (only one-half the actual gain
was required to be reported) estimates th"t ~'1.4 billion of additional
t d xes w0 U I d h ,I ve bee n co I I ec ted had the s e pro fit s be en t a xed i nth e
same manner as income generally. Tr ee s ur y reports covering later years
show that net long-term capitdl (]dins r-eached an all-time high of
$4.1 bi II ion in 1959 and dr op ped to p.S bi II ion in 1960. (6, 18)
The above comments by Hellerstein alluded to the problems associated
w i t n the incidence of the t e x , Th er e is an enormous c o nc ent r e t i on of
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c o r po r e t e i n c omc in d srnall fraction of /\merican corporations. In 1959
1,074,000 corporate Income tax returns were fi led. Only 670,000 of
such returns reflected any taXdble income, whi Ie the rel~ining 404,000
(40 percent) of al I the corporations, reported deficits. There were 600
I a r gee 0 r po r J t Ion s wit 11 net inc 0 Ines 0 f :~10m i I I ion 0 r m0 r e, whie h a (-
counted for about '~26 billion of corporate net income--over one-half the
net i n coine of all corporations in the c ount r y , (6,58-59)
This then brings the problem of tax incidence clearly into focus.
Speaking of the corporate income tax--the question is 1';1,0 really b cur s
the burden? I n r ec e nt y edrs t 11e1- e has bee nag r a v; i n 9 bel i e f am(J n 9 e-
.'
conornists t hu t most, possibly nearly a l ! , of the corporate income tax
is shifted to consumers in the form of higher prices. The most persua-
sive evidence of this shifting is provided by studies showing that, de-
spite rising corporate income taxes during the last thirty-five years,
corporations have stl I I had about the same rate of return on their book
net wo r t h , after taxes. Between 1920 and 1955, the corporate income tax
rates quadrupled; they rose from 12-1/2 to 52 percent; however, the after
tax earnings on book net wo r t h r ema i ned about the same, ne mel y , 12 per-
cent in 1920 and 13 percent for the years 1952 to 1955. If we consider
a I I rne nu t a c t ur i ng corporat ions, the 1920 a fter-tax returns amounted to
eight percent, and for the years 1952 to 1955, the rate was eight and
one-half percent.
Th e corporate income tax is second to the personal income tax as a
revenue producer. During the yeelr 1962, it accounted for :021•3 bill ion,
as compared with :~;50.6 billion for the individual income tax. (6, 58)
The Federal income-tax structure provides that corpordtions be
taxed as s e por e t c legal entities cJnd that stockholders be taxed on tile
I ')
dividends t n ey receive from such ee r n r nqs thereby declared. This double
taxation of the corporations, once to t he corporate entity and again to
the stockholder, is unique in the tax law. The business incorne of indi-
vidual proprietorships and partnerships IS taxed only once--to the owners
of the business; there is no income tax on business enterprises, as such,
in the tax law. In I ike manner, wages, royalties, interest and rents
are taxed just once. There has been w i o es pr eao pressure for the el imina-
tion or the relaxation of the double tax on corporate profits. This ex-
plains the exemption from tax of the first $50 of diVidends and a reduc-
tion of the tax rate on dividends by four percentage points below the
taxpayer's usual rate.
James C. Carter, a noted lawyer and past president of the American
Bar Association, has been quoted as saying: "In every community, those
who feel the burdens of taxation are naturally prone to rei ieve them-
selves from their fiscal discomfort. One class strug~les to throw the
burden off its shoulders. If they succeed, of course it must fall upon
others. They also, in their turn, labor to get rid of it, and finally
the load fa II s upon those who wi II not, or cannot, make a successful
effort for rei i e f ;" (4,4) Carter ungraciously added that the "s t r uq q l e"
is a one--slded a t t a i r , " i n which the rich only engage and In wh i ch the
poor a t wa y s go to the wa II." (4, 4)
Eisenstein, writing in 1961 on the SUbject of progressive taxes,
stated that although ideologies invoke lofty abstractions, they are sen-
sitively adapted to pr ac t i ce l needs. w i t h i n the realm of our fiscal
system today these needs are the progressive income tax and the pro-
gressive estate tax. The above have a direct bearing on the incidence
of such taxes. Both of these types of assessments hdve changed
it
Significantly
over the years; however, one basic question has remained
with U"
;,. Ho"'! are progressiVe taxes to be reconci led with an economic
system h·
. w Ich places a premium upon private initiative and the accumula-
t' Ion of w ca lt h ? t r
I Such a system presupposes dat businesses and individuals
should be busi l y engaged in adding to their inventory of worldly goods;
however
, a p,og,essi" ta. also presuppos" that as t•• abo.,-mentionld
reCipients of tax levies make roore and roore, they would keep a lesser
and lesser 'proration of the gain.
(4, 12)
This contro.ersy within oU' .(onomic In.ironment has spawned .arious
id,ologi's, all of which ha" beln pursued with g".t 'ili",nce. No"
importantly, it ha 5 spawned an
economi c i I I ness with in
the taxpaying en--
tities be they in d iv id ua I s or
corporation, Wl1 i ch rn i ght
be described as
,
'.'
a creeping schizophrenia.
Thl argum.nt ca. bl pur.uld f,om m.ny f.C"'· One ad.oc.,e,
to work- th the I·ncentl·ve to invest- and they
, ey fatally discourage '
"Prog"SSive ,a.es dangerously ".i.i.h the d",re
I'ii
'.I
Eisenst ., eln stated: ir-
repairably f capl·t
al
Impair the sources 0 new •
Our economic system must
com. to an u.tim,ly Ind if pri••te copitol cannot accumulat •• nd pri••te
initiat· I ve is destroyed."
(4, 13) He further exemplified H1e situation
by h I_S vet t h" e f re c t - I! ••• the ad her e n t s 0 f 0 n P I-de 0 log Y
,y sharp remark ° <. ~
may sk iI I fu I I Y borrow th' lo.guag' of .nother in o.der to be more per~"
suasive .. I too
• tt'e devi I knows hOW to quote scripture with a
n ta x law, "
display of conviction.1!
If w, choos' to profit from hi.tory, w' .ay r.
mind
ours.
I
••• th,t
origl'nally, f b'll'ty to pay went hand in hand with
the principle 0 a Iprop e sl·r1gle rate on all incomes. Adam Smith
ortional taxation--the samsu d h· famoUS maxims of taxation. The
mmarized thiS when he ennunciate ISfir t d n smith stated that the subjects
s of these was eqUa I jty of bur e •
(4, 14)
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of every s te t c hiJve an obi igut ion to co nt r i but e towards the support of
the government in proportion to tile respective abilities. that is, as
nearly as possible In proportion to the revenue which they respect ively
enjoy whi Ie under the protection of the state. (4,26-27)
John Stuart 1'li I I condemned the progress i ve tax as "a Illi I d form of
rob b er y • " E i sen s t e ins tat est hat not eve n r; darn Smi t h was e nt ire I y
faithful to the principle of equality as he understood it. After arguing
t ha t taxes should be proportioned to incomes, Smith r ernn k ed , "It is not
very unreasonable t ha t the rich should contribute tothe public expence,
not only in proport ion to their revenue but something more than in that
proportion." (4, 28)
Andrew IvJellon opined t na t the prosperity of the middle and lower
classes depended upon the good fortunes and I ight tax burden of the rich.
(4,63) The r eo so n r n q here, o b v i o u s l y , is that if t h e i r taxes were too
high they would retrench in tile areas of investments--such action there-
by being detrimental to the economy.
D. On The Tax Reform Issues.
Generally speaking, all reform aims have been pointed in the direc--
tion of closing so-called "loopholes" t hr o uqh wn i cn it is alleged that
much i nc orn« eSCdP(~S bearing its proper share of t ne overall tax burden.
Over the past fifteen years repeated attempts have been made at refor-
mation; h owe v er , these have not really been successful in eliminating
the m0 s t f r e que n t I Y cit e d t! I 00 ph 0 I e s • II ct-I a i r rna n 0 f t Il e H0 use \va y san d
Ivleans Committee, Vii l b ur Hi t l s , introduced a bi II (H.R. 1:';230) c o l l ing for
the repeal over a threr-year period of 54 provisions often referred to as
tax shelters or loopholes. Senate Majority leader Mansfield submitted a
companion bill (S. 3657) in the Senate. The intent of the bills'
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i t
spo n snr s was not to hi've II m t f tt
u a 0 rev e n o s 01 e s e pro vis ion s per ma n en t I Y
taken off
the books, but to have them repealed in a systematic manner
9xte d'- . n I n 9 j n t 0 1974 , I 975, a nd I 976.
5, 1-2)
The qu •• tiun m.y be •• ked--why tal reform? Is there • re.1 need
If .0, snov id such' dorm t.ke on the osp,cts of the el irn+
for reform?
ination of
many, or a s rnany as poss ible, 0 f It" abOVl-illentione d 100p-
hales·
, or, should theSe loopholes--more ,ppropri.telY called ra x shelters
,
be redirect.d in such' way that they would generate • boost to the e-
conomy t
'y effecti.9 a higher l,v,l of inv,stment in m.chinery and ,quip-
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payers
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s, production, but
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g' ve the publ ic tM ways and mea'OS of con.um, ng add it iona I producti on.
Sorne
empiric.1 d.t. rel.ting to the above questions is .numer.ted ,n 'he
following comments.
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2. Uifferential rates imposed on different types or mag-
nitudes of income.
For years, Congressional c omrni t t e es v-Ho u s e Ways and l1eans, Senate Finance,
Joint EconomIc, Joint Internal Revenue Taxation--have conducted tax
reform hearings; however, after tens of thousands of pages of testi-
many few tangible results have developed. (5, 12)
Freeman stated: "The fact is that the tax code has grown more
comp l i ce t ed every time Congress has attempted to improve it--most re-
cently so WIth the Tax Reform Act of 1969 which is widely, and justi-
f ia b l y , called trw Lawyers' and Accountants' Full Employment Act of
1969." ( 5,3) He further stated that virtually all provisions that
protect some income from the fu I I impact 0 f t he rate schedu I e--or for
that matter any tax---were put there not by inadvertence, ignorance, or
for the purpose of giving some favored groups improper advantilge or
privileges. 110st of the tax d i t t e r e n t i e t s aim at one or both of tile
f 0 I I ow i n gob j ec t i ve s :
I. To provide greater equity, horizontal or vertical, among
taxpayers dnd differ~nt types and magnitudes of income
by considering different circumstances and offering relief
for hardships.
2. To provide incentives whereby taxpayers may be motivated to
enlarge their activities wh i ch add to the public good. This
is accomplished by r ewe rd i n q some and imposing penalties on
others.
These two objectives often produce conflicting results when translated
i n tot a x pol i ey • (S, 3 -4 )
If it were only a matter of resolving material cordi i c t s , tax
problems would not be so difficult to resolve; however, it is not all
that simple. Certainly, it is not unusual for the controversies to
center around fundamental principles of equity in the distribution of
incorne--or publ ie pol icies that compound the cornp l ication. OUf' lawmakers
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strive for equality and neu t r a t i t y-c-nowc ver , neutrality is almost im~
possible in today's political environment. During the early part of
the twentieth century, the tax bite was approximately 10 to 15 percent
of the nation's income. Ins uc hat a x en vir 0 nmen t , pol i c i es 0 f ne u-
t r e l ity are at i c e s t t n ecr et l ca t t y , and may bc pol itically, feasible;
however, today, with those percentages reaching 40 percent and higher--
the Federal Government cannot leave all individuals in the same relative
position after taxes as before. Freeman states: !IAn even harder division
to resolve is the ideological conflict over the government's role in the
economy." He opined t ha t some believe that the rewards and punishments
of the market place are, by and large, merited and fair. Not only is
this true, but the highest economic growth is produced by giving market
forces the widest possible free rein. In order to insure the greatest
good for the qr ee t e s t number of people over the longest per i od of time,
then, this fact would wish to leave pre-tax relative posItions as un-
disturbed as possible~ In spite of this, many advocates of such a free
market pol icy concede that government may need to provide remedies and
relief for tile economic casualties--whether such casualties result from
impartial forces, the activities of more efficacious groups, or manage-
ment's own fault .. ('.J, 5)
Accordingly, the view has become prevalent that It is government's
prime responsibi I ity to correct the imperfections of the market place--
to alter through political processes the rewards and punishments of the
free operution of the market forces. In some quarters it has become
commonplace to regard government chiefly as a huge devide for the re-
distribution of income from those who have more to those who have less
reg a r die s s a f 1'/ hat rea son s mig htun der lie ani nd i v i dua I "s po 0 r econ 0mi c
condition. ( 5, 6)
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By and IDrge, redistribution of incnme by means of progressive tax-
ation e nd publ ic expenditures has become so generally accepted in the
United States as wei I as other countries of the world that the principle
as a rule of public policy is no longer s eri ou s ly questioned. There
is, however, one question that has not been answered. How far should
any government go In taking a larger 51 ice from those who produce and
earn, and in giving to those who produce less or nothing. Where is the
point at which incentives are weakened? Should the tax structure be
made more progressive than it is, or less? Most arguments over tax
issues, most battle I ines are drawn, and most decisions are arrived at
by the criterion of redistribution of income. (5,6)
One of the most knowledgeable advocates of "loophole closing" was
Professor Stanley S. Surrey of the Harvard Law School. He was appointed
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy in 1961. Although
he spent almost eight years in efforts directed toward tax reform, very
few of his recommendations were put into practice. Surrey theorized
that most of the tax deductions, exclusions, exemptions, and credits
are the equivalent of public expenditures and ought to be t rco t ec as
such and subjected to the same type of annual review by Congress and the
executive branch as any other expenditures. He prepared an estimated
"Tax Expenditures 13udget" wn i cn placed the total between ;~42 and $45
billion for fiscal year 1968. In 1972 he estimuted that government ex-
p e nd it ur e s would be from :!,55 to $60 billion a year through tax conees--
sions. (5, 9-10)
The question of tax shelters always brings up the point that the
rich get an advantage over the poor. This subject has been debated for
decades a nd is always good fuel for political fire. The event that started
the tax r e f orm drive in 1969, was then Tr-easury ~)ecrdary Joseph Barr's
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statement before the Joint Economic Committee just two days before re-
linquishing office. Barr stated: "vie face now the possibility of a tax-
payer revolt if we do not soon make major reforms in our income taxes.
The r evo It wi I I come not from t he poor but from the tens of rni II ions of
middle-class families and individuals with incomes of :~7,OOO to $20,000,
whose tax payments now genera Ily are based on the full ord inary rates
and who pay over one-half of our individual income taxes. The middle
classes are I ikely to revolt against income taxes not because certain
provisions of the levy or amount of the taxes they m~st pay but because
certain provisions of the tax laws unfairly lighten the burdens of
others who can afford to pay_ People are concerned and indeed angered
about the high-income recipients who pay I ittle or no Federal income
taxes. For example, the extreme cases are 155 tax returns in 1967 with
adjusted gross i nco.ne s above ~200,000 on which no Federal "income taxes
were paid, including 21 with incomes above $1,000,000." (5, 19)
Roger A. Freeman states there is no evidence that the middle class
of taxpayers actually bear a disproportionate share of the tax burden
as Barr had alleged. Table II asserts to the contrary.
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 was the first sincere attempt to face
the problem of tax reform that had been advocated for approximately
fifteen years. It was a cautious step--it did not go far and did not
really face the difficult Issues at hand. Among other things, the Act
reduced gas and oil depletion allowance from 27.5 percent to 22 percent,
t i qh t ened the availability of the 25 percent capital g,Jins, established
a minimum tax on income with I imited tax preferences (LTP)and imposed a
4 percent tax on the net investment income of tax-exempt foundations.
These provisions were dwarfed by the tax reductions granted by the Act.
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The f o l Lnw i n q is u n c xump l e of such pr o v i s i on s :
I. Personal exemptions we r e increased to ::\,"150.
2 • flr1 inc rea s e i n t i1est a nd (J I" d de duc t ion to I 5 per c ent wit h
a ma x rmurn of :~2,OuO. (From 10 percent and :1,1,000)
3. Reduction from 70 percent to 50 percent in the top rate
on einned income and a maximum tax for single per-sons
that cannot exceed 120 percent of the amount they would
pay if they were married.
On the overall, the tax liability of returns in the lowest income
bracket was cut by 70 percent, that of returns in the highest bracket
raised by 7 percent. In excess of nine mi II ion pcr sons wer e dropped
from the tax rolls altogether. 5, 12-13)
Although it \'las announced as an attempt to broaden the tax base,
the Tax I~eform Act of 1969 increased the percentage of personal income
that is not normally reached by the Federal income tax by two percentage
points--from 48.2 percent in 1969 to 50.2 percent in 1910. In Oecember
1971 another bi II was enacted by Congress that consisted almost wholly
of tax reductions. Not only did it accelerate some of the relief pr-o-
visions in the 1969 Act but added other remedial provisions. The 1971
measure allowed credit for political contributions for the first time;
widened child care deciuctions; introduced t rie 1 percent investment credit.
It must be noted at this point, that revenue losses resulting from the 1969
and 1971 Acts have contributed to no smal I degree to recent budgetary
deficits. The unified budget def icit ran between $23 and $25 bi I I ion in
the fiscal years 1911 and 1912. All signs point to tr1e fact that deficits
are becoming a permanent feature of our fiscal system. ':i, 13)
Spokesmen for the tax reform drive continue to point out large
dollar amounts that are being lost year after year to tax concessions.
Ways and Heans Cha i rrnan t"1i II s referred to tax concessions as "a form of
backdoor spending." ( 5, 13)
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Now let us delve into some of the sp cc i f t r s of tax reform. The
fire of tax r e fo rrne ti on never burns out, although at times it seems to
die down to mere burning eJnbers~ It can always be fanned into a roaring
inferno by politicians, certain quarters of business, pressure groups,
or Just plain do-gooders. The philosophy of tax r e f or rn for the sake of
income redistribution makes a much better slogan than a working program.
Although reforms can point to existing inequalities in income distribu-
tion, they e I mo s t universally ignore the undeniable progress in real
per capita i nc orne gi.lins that have been made by all income groups over
the post--war period. Although it is now fashionable to downgrade e-
conomic growth, we must real i z c that such growth has contributed greatly
to our standard of living. (II, 3)
The reformers have not attempted to answer, nor are they sure what
would happen to our socio-economic system if a forced large-scale income
redistribution is effected through the tax system. This revolutionary
change could effect w or k incentives, the market processes, and the general
overall s t e ridur d of living. The cold facts are the real wealth of any
industrial country does not I ie in the st0tic distribution of income but
in the dynamic process of production. Before completetly revolutionizing
the tax system in order to bring about a SOCIal change, the Congress and
the ndtion Should address themselves to the question of what such change
would do for the production processes--incentives to work--and not the
least important--incentives to invest.
If we are to embark upon a voyage of "loophole closing" to raIse
additional revenues in order to finance existing government programs--
art 0 ins tit ute new one s --we must I 0 0 kat the e f f ec t 0 f s uc hac t ion i n
the cold I i qbt of economic real i t i e s , Arthur Okun has stated that loop-
hole plugging is "more virtue than revenue." (11,3)
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As ment ioned previously, the project of loophole closing makes for
good political fodder; howe v cr , there are IIIdny specific problems. In
1972 the National Association of Manufacturers of the United States pub-
I ished a position paper written by the Committee on Taxation of that
organization. Tile following are some specific comrnents from that paper:
I. Claims t he t revenue lost t hr o uqh loopholes would be avail-
able by tile el imination of "cost" attributed to these
provisions is absolutely not true. The undeniable fact is
that individuals and industries would not invest in the
exact same manner after such tax changes as they did before.
2. Many of the tax preferences that are, and have been, the
targets of reforrns--such as capital gains---have been a
part of the Code for decades. In many cases the assets
rE:lVe been capitalized long beforehand. /1150, along with
traditional bias against ex-post-facto legislation--it
s e erns very I ikely that any tax reforms have to be appl ied
prospectively and would have to be phased in gradually
over a number of years ..
3 • Ha n y oft he t a x pre fer e n c e sin t e rrns 0 f "c a s t " are en-
joyed by the g rea t rna s s a f mid die - c I ass t a x payer s • Can
we remove the deduction for interest payments without a
compensating government subsidy? Is this an equitable
adjustment? Another thing that we must look at realis-
tically--the revenue cost of tax loopholes enjoyed by
upper-i ncome groups are not rea II y a I I that big due to
the fact there are so few individuals in that category.
4. If tax pr e t e r e o c e s appl icable to the investment sector--
particularly the investment credit are eliminated--
again without compensating rate adjustments--would not
the economy slow down and revenues otherwise derived
from good profit and income performance be lost? (11,.3)
When we quantify the various provisions, we then begin to look ob-
Ject ively into the results of plugging tax loopholes. We might consider
the Joint Economic Committee's compilation of tile or os s budget cost of
so-called major tax subsidies for 1971--estirnated that by eliminating
the whole I ist would probably produce in effect only about a quarter of
that amount (:t8.95 billion) in the initial years. 'de must ask the ques-
tion as to what impact that would have upon the fiscal budget of 1913
of :$250 h i II ion
, and Cl budget deficit neJring :1,30 bi II ion?
Tho s e 'vI how a lJ I d
replace tax incentives with direct government ex-
Dend'I Itures ignore t~le
cost of the new spending programs; however, it
must b e admitted th t d' ht b
a such a proce ure mig e a better vote-getter.
(10,3 )
Where is the additional revenue coming from?
As mentioned prev-
iously, the Joint Economic comrnittee staff recognizeS
reputedly
that tax revenues
"lost" because of present tax law provi sionS assumes that a II
of the "co st "
attributed to theSe provisiuns would be available as rev-
e nue i f such I aw s were changed.
ThiS is not exactly true~
As
an example of the .boV.--the inve.tment credit i. av,il.ble only
to those h
w 0 purch,s. (.pital goods. It is agreed that the ,bsenc
e
of
Such ered I' t
would not e liminate c,p"ol investment hut certainly would
restrict i t T
where the t,xpayer hiS a choice. he exemption of interest
on state
and lac' I bonds is a tax pre ference on IY to those who invest
in such f .
securiti", and only to the eXtent tI"Y oreg
o
hlgl"r yieldS on
al ternat·
Ive taxable investments. If taX preferences were removed there
is no
reason to be Ii eve tna t the amount 5 invested thi 5 way wou Id rema in
r
.' I. ,
,
I,
the (11,12--13)In the case of copitll gainS provisions~if 'ha' preference w.r.
removed Idb'it might we ll be ""t less taxable incom' wo
u
e g.nera ed
than .
IS now the c.s •• With verY feW exceptions, one can run the gamut
of
'O-coll.d tax_prefer"'''s and see that the pa"er
n
of economic behav-
ior
--wh.th,r it be p.rsonal or corporate-~ould not re.
ain
the s.me if
a
Chi.lnge in t h e f t x practiCes as proposed by tile IIloophol
e
I pattern 0 a
ClOsers" w ere rnade. (I I, I2 -I 3 )Th e posit ion papers publ ished by ti" NAH (N,ti
on
•' ASSociation of
ManUfacturers) b e diSCUsses a survey conducted by the
referred to a OV ,
same.
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Bureau of lconofillC ;\ndlysI5 of the Ue par trno n t of Commerce in April and
f'lay 1972. Bu s i n e s s expected to spend :j;89.6 bi II ion on new plant and
equipment dur i n q the y e ar 1972. This amounted to a 10.3 percent in-
crease over 1971 spend i ng (compared wi th an increase of 1.9 percent over
the previous year.) If tax preferences, particularly the investment credit
and AU [{ (A sse tOe pre cia t iu n F~a n ge ), are eli rn I nat ed \1/ itho ute 0m pen sat I n g
rate adjustments, (and this factor is important) the economy itself will
slow down and revenues that are otherwise derived from profit and in-
com e per for ma nc e w i I I bel 0 st.
A ga in. it rna ke s for pop u Ia r pol itic s toe x p 0 und upan the vir t u e S 0 f
tax reduction for individuals by "tightening up on business;" however,
there is more here than meets the eye. It has been proposed by some au-
thorities that this proposition misses the point altogether. They state
that business taxes are borne by individuals in the final analysis. By
increasing the business tax burden, a drain would be created upon wages,
rents, dividends, and the creation of new jobs, not to sp cak of jeopard-
izing future revenue growth. (II, 16)
In a statement made to the Joint Economic Committee in July 1972,
Under Secretary of the Treasury Cohen presented estimates by income
classes of the distribution of the burden of the corporate tax based on
five different assumptions as to the extent of the division between con-
sumers and shareholders. (10,16) These data are presented in Table I I I.
If we assume that consumers bear no portion of the corporate tax burden,
but she r c ho lo er s bear all of it, almost 25 percent falls on A.G.I.
(Adjusted Gross Income) groups under $10,000 and almost 30 percent on
those up to $15,000. Effectively, this amounts to taxpayers in the lower
brackets of the Adjusted Gross Income scale having to bear an undue
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portion of the business tax burden by virtue of the corporate sector
being denied tax preferences.
The combined effect of the 1969 and 1971 Acts, according to U.S.
Treasury information, is an i nc r ea s e in c o rpo r at e Income taxes of almost
:1;5 b ill ion for ttl eye or s I 969 t 0 I 9 72 • I tiS true that c or pcr e t ions
will get significant relief in the future as a result of the 1971 Act,
but the s orne de t a show that by 1980 benefits to individual taxpayers
would be seventeen t i rne s greater than those of corporations from the two
major bi 115. The s e comparisons are shown in Table IV. (II, 19)
As a conclusion of the position paper of the National Association of
Jv1anufacturers: "Che r qe s of tax favoritism for large business over sma l L->
implYing that the large pay lower effective income tax rates--simply do
not stand up. 'r/hi Ie it is easy to show widely differing tax burdens be-
tween individual corporations for a variety of reasons but mainly because
of uneven profit performance and loss carry-forwards--the effective rate
of corporate income taxation for major corporations with assets over $250
mi II ion is virtually the same as for the corporate sector as a whole."
(II, I 9 )
Table V shows effective rates by asset size for all active corpora-
tions and for those with net income. I f we just look at net i ncome--
sometimes this is a better method for measuring effective rates--the large
ccr por e t i o ns paid a sornewha t h i qh er effective rate of tax.
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SECT I ON II
Tax Shelters
The previous discussions covering the tlistory of taxes in general,
the pros and cons of government intervention in private enterprise, as
well as various types of tax shelters, hopefully w i II serve to set the
parameters for the following comments concerning specific account ing
functions that contr-ibute directly or indirectly to tax relief in busi-
ness.
! I,
A. Investment Tax Credit.
This provision was enacted in 1962 as a long-term plan to help
move the economy forward by al lowing a 7 percent credit on machinery and
equipment. It was suspended from 1966-1967 and repealed in 1969 on the
basis that it wa s contributing to inflation. The provision was re-enacted
in 1971 at a 7 percent level. The amount of credit varies with the use-
ful I i f e of the asset and the full 7 percent appl ies only if the property
is held for seven years or more. Assets ordered on or after April 1,1971,
or acquired after August IS, 1971, are el i q i b l c , (11,26)
The 1971 re-enactment is co ns t o er eo a r educ t i o n of the bias in t h e
tax structure against capital formation and investment in producers'
durables. It also assists in replacing, for investment purposes, funds
that are being diverted to meet pollution control r equ i r ernen t s , Inthe
final analysis, in combination w i t h realistic depreciation practice, it
helps to place U.S. firms on a more competitive level with foreign
producers who benefit from certain incentive provisions generally used
in other industral ized countries. National Association of i-1anufacturers'
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rep res e nt d t i v e s h iJ vee rnp 1"1d S I zed the imp 0 r tan ceo f the per rnanenc y 0 f the
credit in order that long-range corrvnitments and planning can anticipate
consistent tax treatment. According to the National Association of
t-ta nu f a c t ur er s , the revenue cost per prel imi nar y Treasury est ime t e s a-
mounted to :(;1.8 billion in 1971, :(;3.6 billion in 1972 and :j)3.9 billion
in 1973. This assumes a 5 percent investment growth and does not re-
flect the "feedback" effect .. (II" 26)
In consideration of the f~evenue Act of 1971, there is still evi-
dence of the bias against capital t o r rre t i o n in the tax structure. The
following data listed on Table VI shows 1971 estimates of the a qur eqe t e
cost recovery allowances for t he United States--with Asset [)epreciation
Range and the 7 percent investment credit--relative to those of eleven
,I 1
other leading industrial countries. The above-mentioned data, repre-
sented by Table VI, states the United States position is improved; however,
it s t i II remains less favorable than the average of this foreign competi-
tion. The aggregate cost recovery allowances (percentage of cost of
asset) for the first taxable year shows the United States average to be
28.3 percent versus 25.7 percent for the foreign countries; however, for
the first three taxable years and the first seven taxable years, the re-
lated averages are 57.B percent and 90.5 percent for the United States
versus Sfl.3 percent and 91.3 percent for the f o r e i gr1 countries. It
might be noted that the data shown in the above-referenced table does
not reflect changes in the United Kingdom after October, 1970. In ad-
d it ion, the data overstates t rie United States percentages somewhat be-
cause effect of the modified first-year convention, disallowed by the
Revenue Act of 1971, is included. The data also assumes double-declining
method of depreciation and a change to s t ra i qh t= l ine in the seventh year.
( I I, 22)
35
81
In 19
62 Secretary of the Treasury Dil Ion argued for the dual ap-
proach of ..,
modernization of depreciation guidelines and for implementa-
tion
of t h e original i,,,e5tment credit in ord.r to pldce the United States
on a better
footing .i5-
a
-.
i
• for comp.tition. 'ft,r t.n "dr. of r.pid
tech. nological
ch.ng
O
coopl.d with incred •• d .conomic .,.ol •• cence of
product'
i ve facil iti". ond at first" g,,"cwl. then precipilau.l, deClin-
ing trade - ."." .
bo Ia nee. th i s ergoment ,eo" more a ro more cons< deration.
( II, 22-23)
Anothe
x r ee 50 n f or a more elf" ti v e cost recover,s,. t em is thOt
the
rules o f the game concerning air and water poliuti
OO
hoe' changed
drastically
do I I a rs to
ovar the last ten ,,,rs• IndUStr, must spend bi II r ons of
becoming
more regi' as tinre goes b,. It should be o,viOU
S
that it is
Inuch- more
difficult noW" finance new machin,r, and ,quipm.
n
' to io-
c ornp l y with new air and water quol it' stoodards--th"e are
cr ea s e production while
rnitments.
at the sam. tim' m•• t these new con.
rol
com-
( I I, 23)
shows graphicallY the combined effect of Incr"sed capi'al
Con sumr1tl'on t f t f t
allowances r
el
•
te
" to after-ta, ra es 0 re urn or ,sse s
with . .ten-, fifteen-, and t.ent,_,ear ser
vcce •• aS5U.cng ,hat the ass.
t
•
Yield 10 . t· ba<is Th' combined
percent on a straigh.-line d.pr€C" IOn 0 •
ef feet . n,' ra.e of return is i n-
IS noticeable in all three cases.
creased by d deprecl"ation and a -r percent investment
ou tJ Ie -d e c lin i n g
credit to 12 co t f ten-_year asset, 12 percent for a fifte
en
-'
a.) percen "or a
Che r t
year asset , a nd
data st,)tes the
60 percent of the increase in rateS of return.The . t red res i stance bdore it
Investment credit provision enCo
un
e
11.7 percent for a t.ent,_,ear •• ,.t.
credl
"t provision accounts for approximately
i nvestrnent
The referenced
al
I
\:
I
was finally enacted
neSsmen who
.er. not b.n.fiting from the "., but also from those .ho
into law.
This opposition came not only from busi-
were.
Although many opposed the credit on the grounds of .quity, f.w
denied its eff t'
'. ee ,,,neSS as J m.thod of stimulating iovestment. (12,129)
The .
, ••• stment cr.dit provision waS susp.nded during the p.riod
October 10
, 1966, through MMeh 9, 1967, in order to counteract the in-
f Iat· r o na r y
pr.s,ures that d••• ,oP.d during .h' e.rly p.rt of the Vi"nam
As the infl.tio
n
tr.
nd
continu•d at a high rat., the er.
dit
was
repealed effective Aprl
crit· lei sm ce n
be leveled at the credit.
19, 1969.
( 12,129)
It is true, substant i v e
r
I I
War.
Un like OHler reduct ions in
rates that.
would b.nefit .1 I industry, thiS provision , •• or.d c.pilal-
intensi .ve Industry.
to be wide"po read;further,
EXP.ri.
nc
' with the origin.' credit sl"w.d its use
it was highly SUCClssful in .ncouCOging invest-
During the period 1962
r,
ment
, ernp l oyrne nt and in increasing productivity.
thr au gh 1969 output per
the n 3
_ percent per year, whil' empIOym",t increased by 3.
2
million.
Floyd G. Lawre
nCl
, EXeC
u
' iV' Edi'" of _Ln~' has suggest.d
.an-
hOUr
in the m.nuf,cturing s.cto
r
rose more
a more II .a c t i v i st" role for industry-
past for industry to plead for peanuts.
He has stdted that the time has
It is no longer sufficient to
take
their hat in hand .nd beg politicions no' to turn ,he on-og
ain
in-
Vestment t-ax credit off again-
be ret . d u s d Ia'ned as • growth s.imuluS whiCh will pro UCI re
ven
' an a so
demand evidence I·t should no' bl 15 or 20 percent r,ther .han
to shOWwilY
7
percent enOUgh merelY to accept depreciation !lrefarm."
.. It is no longer
Industry shou I d demand fundoment ,I and sweepi ng chaages in all owances
Instead, industry shoul d i ns i st the cred i t
Which understate
$10 b i I .lion edeh
co
sts and overstate profit. by .p,roximotel,
replacement
year.
23 )( I I ,
<1 J
1-, From the beginning in 1913, U. S. citizens, residents, and corpo-
rations have been t e xe b le world-wide on all their income regardless from
what geographical sources derived and foreiqn losses have been deductible.
Fur-ther, a foreign c orp o ra t i o n t re d i t i o na t ly has been treated as a sep-
ar e t e ent i t y , except after 1937 in the tax avoidance case of a foreign
personal holdinq company. To eliminate what was labeled as confiscatory
double taxat ion, Congress in 1918 enacted the foreign tax credit provi-
sions. This credit at first allowed all foreign income taxes to offset 1
, I
I 'the U. S. tax t i a b i I ity on a dollar-far-dollar basi s , By 1921, evidence
proved that the foreign tax credit was going beyond the basis purpose of
the el imination of double taxation. Because of the unl irnited amount of
the credit, foreign taxes could and did offset U. S. taxes on U. S. in-
comes. As t h e r-esult of this, in 1921 two lirnitations were added to the
law--the o ve ra t I I imitations and the corporation-by-corporation I imita-
tions. In general, these lirnitations confined the credit to an offset
only against U. S. taxes on foreign income. In the year 1932 Congress
adopted the country-by-country I im i t a t i on , This prevented foreign in-
come taxes paid to one country from offsetting U. S. taxes on income de-
rived from another country. After 1932 the foreign tax provisions were
many times the subject of Congressional scrutiny; however, al I pre-1962
changes were directed toward more I iberdl allowances. In 1942 certain
foreign excise tQxes were brought within these provisions and also taxes
paid by a second-tier foreign subsidiary were permitted to be credited
at the time their earnings found their way to the domestic parent corpo-
r e t i o n , In 1943, the corporation-by-corporation limitation was removed.
In 1942, due to complaints by certain corporations operating in
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Latin America, tIle Western Hemisphere Trade Corporation provisions were I C1 1
adopted. tl surtax exemption was allowed corporations doing all of their
business in the Western Hemisphere and engaging in the active conduct of
business. (I, 228-230)
For t ne period 1950-1961 certain che n qc s were made. Three Liberaliz-
ing modifications were enacted into law in the Hevenue Act of 1951:
I. Exemption of foreign earned i nc o.ue was extended to U.S.
citizens who could not qualify as residents of a foreign
country; however, they were abroad 17 out of 18 months.
2. To effect minimization of death taxes for estates with
foreign investments, a foreign estate tax credit was
enacted.
! ,
3. Stock ownership re~uirements were reduced for permitting
foreign taxes of first-and second-tier subsidiary corpora-
tions to qual ify for foreign tax credits. 1,230-231)
In 1961, President Kennedy designed heavier tax burdens on overseas
operations of American business--malnly due to the fact th~t reasons no
longer existed for investing in developed countries. The Revenue Act of
1962 changed the historic pattern for taxation of income from foreign
operations"
I. Und i s t r i bu t ed "tax-haven" income of controlled foreign
corporations was subjected to current taxation to
United States shareholders.
2. The foreign tax credit al lowed for foreign taxes of
foreign subsidiaries operating in developed countries was
required to be "grossed-up."
3. The earned income exemption of United States citizens
was reduced considerablYn
4. Earnings of foreign corporations were taxed as ordinary
income in case of liquidations and sales of stock of such
corporations.
5. A separate limitation was added to the foreign tax credit
for passive interest received from foreign countries.
( I, 239)
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is done in all effort to stimulate capital formation and growth; to
introduce new products and methods a s well as expand employment. (5, 47)
D. 1\llowances_ for Depreciation.
In 1947, United Stotes Steel Corporation engaged in a battle of
depreciation ideologies by computing depreciation, for financial state-
ment purposes, on the basis of estimated replacement costs. Its inde-
pendent C.P.A.'s refused to accept the financial statement so prepared.
u. S. Steel finally had to retract their position. Tile position of
U. S. Steel is s ba r c o today by many businessmen and financial analysts.
From some points of view, depreciation to a going concern is sometimes
felt to be the provision of sufficient funds from current revenue to re-
place assets as they wear out. It IS sometimes e r qu ed that, to the ex-
tent that depreciation allowances are based upon original cost rather
than replacernent costs, the income tax is actually taxing capital. The
basic rationale is that income can exist only after a reasonable provision
(in terms of current price levels and conditions) for rnei nt a i n i nq t he
productive capacity of the organization. To the extent that depreciation
is less than this, the income tax is actuallyacting to expropriate capital.
13, 202)
As alluded to above, basic accounting t nc or y states that deprecia-
tion is not to cover replacement costs of capital assets--rather it is to
provide for the protection of invested capital (original cost less salvage
ve l u e , ) It is true that some companies, some large ones, over-depreciate
capitdl assets for purposes of their Profit and Loss Statements. ThiS,
in effect, reserves certain elements of profit for replacement at current
or anticipated costs. However, for income tax purposes, this over-
depreciation is written back on to the books.
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SECT I ON I I I
An Appraisal of The Investment Tax Credit
Although the foregoing passages discuss tax shelters in general
terms, specific analysis requires that a particular type of shelter be
isolated and v i ewed in more detail. This type of a na l y s i s needs to be
conducted from the standpoint of what the specific tax preference does,
what segments of the economy are effected, and the element of grant to
the business world brought into play in ea cn case. The investment tax
1
, ,
I
credit is chosen for this discussion.
A • .!:s.gislative and Fiscal Background.
Preparatory to discussing a quantitative analysiS of the investment
I
(
I
I
tax credit, it would seem apropos to review the Tax Reduction Act of
1975, P.L. 94-12~ (H.f~. 2166). This review wi II not attempt to cover
all facets of the legislation--just those areas pertaining to the invest-
ment tax credit and related subjects as necessary for analytical purposes.
Under the former law (the term former law applying to proviSions in
existence prior to the passing of P.L. 94-12) the investment credit ap-
plied to machinery and equipment placed in service but not to structures.
The former credit allowed a deduction from tax I ia b i I ity amounting to
7 percent of t n e cost of investment--4 percent in the case of publ ic util-
i t i e s , This credit was in addition to depreciation (i.e., it did not
change the basis for computing depreciation). The e t t owe b t e credit could
not exceed $25,000 plus one-hal f of taxable income in excess of $25,000.
A 3-year carryback and a 5-year carry forward of unused investment credit
were avai i ab l c , The amount of the investment that qual ified for the credit
depended on the useful life of the asset. Property Vii ttl a useful life of
4-6
less than three y eo r s did not qual ify. Onc=t h i r o of t n e cost of property
with a useful life of t nr e c to five years was eligible for the credit--
twa-thirds of the cost of property with a useful life of five to seven
years was eligible and t rie full cost of property having a useful life of
seven years or rnore was el igible. The r e was a I imit of t50,OOO on the
arnount of used property e l igible for the credit. 17, 29)
The Administration proposal provided a temporary one-year increase
i nth e c red itt 0 I 2 per c e n t for a I I pro per t y -- t his inc Iud ed pub I i cut iii t Y
pro per t y • I n add i t ion, uti lit i e s we ret 0 co nt i nue tor ec e i ve c red i t for
investment in electrical power installations o tn er than oil and gas-fired
facilities. Th e credit was to be applicable to property placed in service
in 1975 as wei I as that property ordered in 1975 if placed in operJtion
prio r tot he c los e 0 f I 976. I nth e cas e 0 f uti lit I est he 0 ne-h a I f 0 f t a x-
able income limit was to be increased to 75 percent for 1975 and then to
decline until it reached 50 percent again in 1980. Th e total impact on
revenue was est imated to be $4 bill ion.
So much for the Adrninistration's proposal. '<Jhen the bi II reached
the House. certa in changes were made. It provided a temporary one-year
increase in the credit to 10 percent for all types of property t na t would
be placed in service after January 2, 1975 and prior to January I, 1976.
This included publ ic uti I ity property. It might be mentioned that, in
the cas e of pub I i cut iii tie s , t [1e inc rea sed c red i twa s 1 i mit edt 0 $ I 00
mi II ion for anyone company. For publ ic uti I it i e s tile one-half of tax-
able income limit Vias to increase to 100 percent for 1975 and 1976 then
decreased by ten percentage points each year unti 1 it reached 50 percent
in 1981. The used property I imitation was set at $75,000 for one year.
The b i II, as passed by the House. allowed a permanent change by
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allowing an earl i e r investment credit for property r equ i r Ln n at least two
years to construct. Th e t e x pa y er would be allowed to include in the
base of the credit amounts expended (attributable to the taxable year)
on the property during the construction period. This is versus waiting
until the property was p l a c c o in service. Under the above-mentioned
House version, the revenue loss was estimated atp.9 billion. Of this
loss, :~1.5 bi II ion was forecasted to occur in 1976.
It is interesting to compare the Administration proposal and H.R.
2166. Both proposals increased the investment tax credit--the
Administration recommended a higher percentage increase. On tiling common
to both proposals was that t he y were designed to stimulate t nc economy by
encouraging businesses to increase their capital investment in machinery
and equipment. Both proposals increased the percentage allowance to
pub I i cut iii tie seq ua Ito the rat e a I I owed 0 the r- bus i nesc; e s • I t rnus t be
mentioned that H.R. 2166 set a limit on the credit for public utilities
to $100 mill ion for a s i nq l e company. As ca n be noticed from the above,
there was no important difference in the revenue loss estimated by each
pr o po s e I. 17, 29-31)
The Tr eo s ur y Department offered testimony to the Senate Finance
Committee in which the Secretary of the Treasury Supported the increase
in the investment cred it to 12 percent rather t rian 10 percent. The
Secretary proposed that although the di fference between 12 percent and
lOp ere e n t Ind y see rn sma I I, til e d iff e r en c e co u I d res u I tin a sic] n i f i can t
differential In t h e overall rate of return on investment.
The Senate Finance Committee compi led their own version of H.R. 2166.
They increased the investment cr-edit for all businesses to 12 percent for-
the period January 21,1975 t nr o u qn December 31,1976. This included
pub I .I C ut I' t i t i e s .
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IVe ca
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In s ear c n for a d i e uno s t s of tile i n t l c t i o n=unernp l oymc n t dilemma,
Ie
("q u
a novel 5 0 I uti u n i s 0 f fer e d bY but I erUn i v er sit y econ 0mi s t .Jenos H0 r vat h •
He has stated t h e t many seemingly rn i nu t e changes evolving inside the
American economy during the past four decades have reached a point where
they alter important systematic relationships. The inflation-unemployment
phenomenon of current years presents a dilemma largely because it is oc-
curring within a national economy of changing structure. Conventional
concepts of economic analysis that could be used to diagnose past problems
do not now fully suffice. (8, I) "The qr ow i ng i ns t itut i ona I c nt a nq l ements
of contemporary national economy have prompted a paradoxical framework
wher e in' imp lie i t 9 ran t s' (t ran s fer s ) a c c rue top r i v i leg ed gr 0 ups inc 0m-
pensat ion for the restraint of market supply. This amounts in micro-
economics to the rewarding of ~-achjevement and in macroeconomics to
the rewarding of negdtive--achievernent." (8,2) "Th e 'invisible hand' of
the market system is held down by 'visible hands', to the ultimate de-
trirnent of the ne t i o na l economy." (8, 10) A central idea is that since
implicit grants inspire and reinforce the present inflation-ridden un-
employment, distinction should be made between Itgrants" wh i ch are
counter-productive and those which do enhance and are conducive to op-
timal capacity utilization. (8, 2)
wna t is perceived here is tile notion of rnisappl ied grants. It is
true that the precepts of Adam Smith were vuiced in a by-gone day, sur-
rounded by a different economic environment. Yet the question remains:
have we become so sophisticated that we now think of the law of supply
and demand as no longer relevant to today's economic problems? It must
be admitted that our economic way of life is more complex t rie n in former
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Although t he cost of money has decreased In recent months, the past
lit C
"lC'qu;
three to four years have spanned a period of high-cost borrowing.
The prime rate of interest at The Chase Manhattan Bank in New York
Cit yin c rea sed fro m 5 - 3 /4 per c I" nt a s 0 f De( embe l' 3 I, I 97 Ito I I per c I" n t
at December 31p 1974. Since that time it has moved downward until it
reached 7-1/2 pe ec e nt at December 31, 1975. Early months of 1976 have
shown some continued reduction; however, it (annat be said that the cost
of borrowing is low.
As mentioned previously, prior to the Tax Reduction Act of 1975,
P.L. 94-12; the investment credit allowed a deduction from tax liabil-
ity equal to 7 percent of the cost of investment (4 percent in the case
of public utilities). The credit was in addition to depreciation
(i.e., it did not change the basis for computing depreciation).
P.L. 94-12 provided a temporary two-year increase in the investment
credit to 10 percent for all property (including pub l i c utility property)
placed in service after January 21, 1975 and before January I, 19TT.
41though the following numerical values are relative, depending
upon the tax liability of a company and its exp e rd i t ur es for capital,
they are used here for explanatory purposes. I f a c ompa ny ' s t a x I i a b i 1-
ity is ;~IOO.OOO prior to the deduction of the investment credit, and
as the result of purchasing 4>100,000 worth of qualifying mach i ner y and
equipment such company takes the allowable credit, the net I ia b i I ity IS
reduced to ~~90,000. Effectively, t h i s means t n e credit has resulted in
a grant of ~IO,OOO and for purposes of definition, a grant ratio of
10 percent relative to the gross tax liability. Trie expansion of this
brief example to all industries on a nation-wide basis will give some
insight as to the potential of this partIcular tax prOVision.
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Be f 0, e f UI" t tl ere x d rn I n i n q the Vd, i 0 usa s pec t s iJ n cJ ClI t e, n iJ t i v e s
lIlic
llC'rj u a li t.y .
associated w i t h Hie r nv c s t rnen t credit, one might ask what has been
accomplished by this tax provision. It is somcwha t difficult to pos-
itively identify c er t a i n economic t r e no s with the effectivity of the
In spite of the above-mentioned increase in plant and equipment,
credit; however, it would seem that some conclusions c.i n be reached
based upon c er t a i n empirical de t a ,
Chart I I Shows business expenditures for plant and equipment
covering the years 1960 through 1975. A five-yea, average of expend-
i t ur e s increased from 4'36.75 billions in 1960 to :1511.42 billions in
1965. This period, of course, spanned the original 7 percent invest-
ment credit e ne c t e d in 1962. Fr orn 1969, the year that the original Act
was repealed, through 1970, expenditures increased f r om ~;75.56 bi II ions
to $79.71 bi II ions--only :i)4.15 bi II ions; however, for t he period 1971,
the year of re-enactment of the credit through 1975, yeJrly expenditures
increased from 'i)81.21 billions to ~;116.08 billions, ma i nt a i n i nq an ilV-
erage level of :1;99.57 bi II ions per year.
t ue question might be asked as to how this investment was utilized.
Table VIII covers the period 1950 through t h e first quarter of 1975.
Using the y ee r' 1967 as an Index of 100, all rnanu f a c t ur i ng capacity moved
from 50 in 1950 to 161 as of l-ia r c h 31, 197~). Percentage of output to
capacity never fel I below 75, which was for the year 1971, except the
first quar t e r of 1975 which s howe d a percentage utilization of 68. For
all intents and our po s e s , this indicates that, in spite of an increase
in capacity, utilization kept pace reasonably well. (16,732)
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A number of other factors apre0r to show positive correlation
with the effectivity of the i nv e s tr.re nt tax credit. These include, but
are not limited to: capital appropriations and expenditures by large
corporations; capital investment per worker; that portion of G.N.P.
applicable to p r i v a t c investment; and reduction of the prime rate of
interest. These are not examined in detdi I due to their broad expanse
and the pro b ,I b iii t Y t h (J t v o rio u sot her con d i t ion S co u I d h iJvema dee f fec-
tive contributions.
,I\t t h i s point, the question is e sk eov-what o t nc r tax incentives
could ho v« b ce n legislated that wu u l d produce as good or better o ver a l t
e c o norn i c e d v a n t e qe s ? The I ist is long and var i ed ; however, enumerated
below are a few examples:
I. Du not n i n q w r t h tile 7 percent credit as first e s t ab l i sh ed
in 1962.
2. Decrease the credit.
3. Set tile credit at SOllie higher percentage point level.
4 • Eli In i 11ate the c red ita Ito get her and ins tea d , pro v ide for
the gr('Hltlng of concessionary loans to industry under
c er t a i n qual ifying conditions.
It would appedr that the first and second of the iJbove alternatives
are self~-defecltlr1g .. Th e t n i r d alternative is omitted clue to tile fact it
is closely related to the law as amended. The fourth would seem to offer
more potential for exploration.
The objective of capitJI expansion CCJn be achieved in vdrious ways,
some more beneficial t ha n others; h cwc v er , for purposes of c x ernp l ifica-
t i o n a hypothetical situation is used. The assumptions and questions
mentioned b c l ow w i II serve a s parameter-s for- the example.
I • The CJ, ",,1Iver-nmcnt 5eel<s
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( I ) G L
\
/ -_--_. , Where:
-'--~------
J ._. ( I + q) J
G--is the grant equivalent (subsidy) in cash terms;
L--IS tile face value of the loan;
T--is t h e time of maturity in years;
q--is the opportunity rate of discount;
Cj and Ij are respectively the capital repayment
and interest payment due at the close of the j-th year.
(2 )
I
'-.
-qH -qT
, Where:ee
g'
q (T - M)q
g'---is the grant r o t i o of t nc c o nc c s s i o nar y loan: .
M --is the moratorium years on repayments, i.e., the
grace period.
I -qr-1 -qT
I
I
e :2 ~g I •••• ·+gn
(3 ) g I - -~-
q q(T - 1'1)
I
g--is the total grant ratio;
g I·· ·gn--are the general statements for
ad~itional grant components.
(7,162-169)
The e t or crocnt t o n eo co n t r-oct ter-ms arc r epee t ed for purposes of
the f 0 I I [)VI i n 9 f 0 rrnu I a :
)1
g'------------is the grant rdtio.
------------is the interest rate of .0475.
q ------------is the opportunity cost of .0675.
T ------------15 the period of the loan--namely--15 years.
M ------------is the moratorium period of I year.
Therefore:
q '
.0675 (15 - I)
-: .0(75) (I) - (.0675) ( I 5 )
2.718 2.718
s ' .1 18
From the above computation, it can be stated that for every dollar
loa ned u n d er ttl e t erm s 0f con tr a ct , s I i9h t IY a ver II,;:con stit ute san
element of grunt. t:lefore discussing the advantages or disadvantages of
concessionary loans versus the investment tax credit, there is a need to
know what must be done to make such loans conform to the grant ratio of
I I percent. A prerequisite to this is a sensitivity analysis of the
concessionary tenns of the contract. Such an a na ly s i s can be made by
using one of the independent variables.
c T
.;)
\(7 g
l]
(9, I II )
The above represents the absolute sensitivity of grant ratio with
respect to the time period of the loan. Other vilriables can be substi-
tuted for p ur po sc s of a na ly s r s ,
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Fur t [1 e r, t I) l' rei a t I V c 5 ens it I V 1 t Y 0 f t 11e ~lran t r i) t i0 wit h res pect
lOllii c
1nc'Ql
to the various contract terms cun be determined by the following:
s T
9
where j is t he genera I
notation for the variable,
I.e., T,i'l,i, etc.
(9, I I I )
By use of t h e above me t ho do lo qy the following data may be computed for
.; ~
·1 I
purposes of analysis:
Concessionary Loan
Concessionary Factors
Contract
Terms
~~
Grant
Ratio Absolute Relative
Sensitivit
Time of maturity-years. 15 0.0052 0.0726
Moratorium-years (Grace). 0.0073 0.1020
Rate of interest. 4.75';£ -0.0591 0.825'1-
Discount rate as
opportunity cost.
6.75/0
Grant ratio of loan. .1 18
Totals--sensitivity. 0.0716 I .0000
The above-mentioned absolute sensitivity (Jives the "percentage point"
change in the grant ratio when the contract term is changed by a certain
amount. The relative sensitivity shows the relative weighting, or con-
tribution, of the contract term toward the grant ratio. (9, 110-1 t I)
From the above data certain basic information Cdn be made avai lable
from w h ich c ornpe r isons may be Illude. If it is desired to encourage the
expansion of private capital by the use of concessionary loans--since the
grant r e t i o is highly sensitive to change in the rate of interest--it
would seem that this contract term should be modified to effect the afore-
mentioned requirement.
T [1e d b 0 ve fI"Idy be use d d sat 00 I by pol icy rna k er sin ilr r j v i n9
at the best pos~jble methods for boosting certain sectors within the
overal I economic structure, or inversely, slowing down certain areas
that might be contributing to conditions detrimental tothe economy.
From the above eXdmple, the sensitivity of the grant ratio with
res pec t to a c h iJ n9 e i nth era teo fin t ere s tis equa Ito 0.0591. If,
for example, it is desired to reach a grant ratio of II percent, the
desired decrease of 0.0080 (0.1180 - 0.1100) can be reached by increas-
ing the interest rate from 4.75 to 4.89 percent (0.0080/0.0591 = .1354
and 4.75 percent + .1354 = 4.89 percent). This result can be verified
by substituting the revised rate in the aforementioned formula which,
with all other factors r erre i n i no constant, will result in a grant ratio
of I I percent. Other contract terms may be changed in like manner by
the use of the sensitivity analysis.
vJhat o o e s the above mean in terms of real-life investment practices?
Suppose a business wishes to purchase machinery and equipment costing
$500,000; if t h e transaction qualifies under tile investment tax provision,
the amount of grant involved is $55,000 and the grant ratio IS II percent.
In this particular case, the tax loss to the government would be $5~,OOO.
If, on the other hand, the business is not afforded the opportunity of a
tax credit but Cdn apply for a concessionary loan with contract terms
of the aforementioned example, t h e grant ratio is 11.8 per-cent. Ely in-
creasing the rate of Interest from 4.75 percent to 4.89 percent, as
mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the grant ratio IS equal to that
of the investment tax credit.
Furtr1er, if the Interest rate in the preceding example is raised
from 4.75 to S.7S percent, With at lather contract terms remaining constant,
IThe gra nt r e t i 'o IS reduced to 5.91 percent.
When applying thiS to the
of rnae t'l i
ne r y and e'l' i pment cost i no ~500.000. the res'" is'
Inered s e In
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Conclusion
The f o r e qo i nn pages ~1(]ve alluded to t h e subject of taxes from the
stdndpoints of general history, growth and incidence. Tax shelters have
been discussed as to the general types most commonly referred to and used.
A specific tax shelter, nemc l y the investment credit, hJS been discussed
in s orne detail. Lastly, this particular tax shelter na s been viewed from
the standpoint of the grant (i .e., transfer payment contained therein)
by the methodology of quantitative analysis.
It now s e crns necessary to view the subject of this paper in the I igtlt
o f a I I t hat rla s bee n dis c usse d • The que s t ion -- T a x She I t er s : Econ 0mi c
Stimuli Or lvtedia Of Inequality--must be answered in a mann er that is
meaningful in trw context of our present economic environment. Literally
nu rid r e d s of volurnes, pamphlets, studies, analyses, hearings, and testi-
monies have been written and conducted relative to this particular portion
of our tax structure. After al I of these efforts, it appears to the
writer that a tax shelter can be either an economic stimuli or a medium
of inequal ity, depending upon its provisions and its appl ication.
At this stage of our economic growth, we do not I ive wholly within
a laissez-faire environment as depicted by Adam Smith and advocated now-
adays by l-i i lf o n Friedman. Neither do we live completely within the
realm of corpordte giantism and planning as proposed by polemic econom-
i C5 of John Kenneth Gal bra i ttl. Rather, we are faced vi j th prob I ems, the
solutions to which are best approached through the analysis of balance
between exchange and grants economics, as perceived by Kenneth E. Goulding
and h i s school. Society IS best served, and it in turn can serve
, I
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Shares of the Federal Individual Income Tax
By Hajor Income Gr-ackets, 1970
Adjusted Gross
Income Br e c k e t
Share of Adjusted
Gross Income
Share of
_1. a x L i~i_tL_
Under 'p,OOO 19.5% 10.5%
,
,I
I
~7,OOO to ~19,999 59.2% S4.0'7o
$20,000 and over 21.3% 35.5(;0
No~: Compiled by Internal R."venue Service and cited as Stati~1J_~_
J ncom~, 1970.
Source: Fr e erne n , Ro qer A., Ta~__QJ:!l~~, we sb i n qt on , D.C., American
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy nesearch, 1974, p • 21.
T/\8LE III
Adjusted F-uI I Fon'lard 3/
4 Borne 1/2
BOI-ne I /L~ Borne Fu I I
Gross Sh if t to
by consumer. by
consumer. by Consumer.
Burden
Income consumer
1/4 [lorne 1/2
Borne 3/4 Borne on
Class Prices
by Share-- by
Shdre- by Share-
Share-
_J2_~~______l1_Q_~
holder
I
I
\
\
\
I
($000 l··'~--------·--·------ (:~;
bi I Iionsl----------------------------------
0-3 2.8
2.Cl 2.8
2.7 2.7
3-5 2.4
2.1 I.8
I.6 1.3
5--7 2.9
2.4 2.0
I.5 1.0
7-10 5.4
4.5 3.6
2.6 I.7
10-15 7.5
6.3
5.2 4.0
2.8
15-20 4.0
3.5
3.0 2.5
2.0
20-50 3.3
4.3 5.3
6.3 7.3
50-100 0.1
I.7
2.6 3.6
4.6
lOa-up 0.5
I.9
3.4 4.9
6.4
Totals
~: Net liability at calend" yeor 1971 levelS after all creditS.
29.6 29.6
29.6 29.6
29.6
'I
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T/\8LE IV
Combined Effect of Changes in Tax Laws and Regulations Since
January I, 1969 on Corporations iJnd l nd i v i dua t s "
(In Billions of Do l t a r s )
1969-1980 ,.,.
1969-72 1972 12 years /\verage
I year.
Corporate Income Taxes -1<~4-. <)
-'j; 8.1 -~0.7
Individual Income Taxes -18.9 -12.0
-140.7 -I 1.7
Excise Taxes--Primari Iy
Affecting Individuals
3- t:- .:J - 2.6 - 19.7
- 1.6
._----------------------------------
Note: *Treasur-y estimates, see Cohen, E.S., op.cit., Apr I l 1972.
-·Assumlng economic growth.
Source: National As s o c i et i un of ~1anufacturers, Committee on Taxation,
'v/ea!..!l~xation and Fiscal Policy, A Position Paper, 1972, p.19.
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TABLE: V
Effective corporate Income Tax Rates
Total Tax Paid and Tax Less Temporary Surcharge, I 969--A I I
Corporations a nd Those With Assets of $250 tv1illion or More
---------------,-------------------------------------------
Returns of All
r~at e s-------.--~----
__ ----'F-'-( a t e s
Asset Size
Tax Less
Surchar ~
Total
_I_<l_L_
Tax Less
Surctlarge
~i250 I'li I I ion
or More
45.0 40.7
43.3 39.2
A I I corpora-
tions 46.6
42.3 40.0
36.4
-----------------------
Note: Effective rates in the above table reflect tax I iabil ity after
deducting the investment credit but before the foreign tax credit,
divided by net income.
,"-o~: Na t r o ne I A,,0< lOb DO 0 f Nonu f oct ur er: s , CO"'" itt" on To xa t ; 00.
Wea !J:_t;_" TaX'tI 00 a ad ,'; sc e I Po I Ig.. A "00 It; 00 Pap'" '912. cor ocr ate
Income Tax F~et~~1969i;;;l;r~inary, p.20.
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TABLE VI
Cost Hecovery A II owances for Hach i ner y and Equ ipment in
Leading Industrial Countries
-----------------
Representative
Cost Recovery
Period
in
Years
Aggregate Cost necovery A II owance:
~ercentage _of Cost of _A_s_s_e_t_
First Tax--
able Year
First 3 tax- First 7 Tax-
able Years able Years
------------
Belgium 10 20 ..0 48.8 139.0
Ca na da 10 20.0 413.8 79.0
France 8 31.3 67.5 94.9
Italy 6 20.0 65.0 100.0
Ja pa n 1 I 34.5 56.9 81.4
Luxembourg 10 28.0 60.4 101.9
Netherlands 5 10.0 42.4 77 .1
Sweden 5 30.0 65.7 100.0
Switzerland 6-2/3 15.0 58.4 90.0
United Kingdom* 12 57.8 78. I I02 • I
vJestern Genna ny 9 16.7 49.6 8E3.8
Average percentage of
above countries 25.7 58.3 91.3
u.s. With Asset
Depreciation Range
and 7% Investment
Credit 10-1/2
90.5
..
No t e : Does no t un i t eo Kir)(1dDrnafter october, 1970._ rc f Iec t changes in ~
~ou~ce. R' t Tack Fovee or) Business Taxation and
o , • epor of the President's - ,-
U. S. Department of Tr co sur y , 1971 estimates.
TABLE V I I
f..ornparative Depreciation Schedule: :j;_1,000 llssg
straight-
Double Decl ining-
Surn·-of-Years-
~ ___hLo~--
Elalance
__ ~J._g__i_J:~---------
100
200
182
2 100
160
164
3 100
12B
145
I
4 100
102
127
I 5
100
82 109
I
6 100
66
91
I
7 100
65.5
73
8 100
65.5
55
I
I 9 100
65.5
36
10
_____l>~~2_
18
I
_I_QIL_
Totals 1,000
1,000
1,000
Pr·ese nt
value of 6j{) :
Uepreciation
t,lloltiances 736
ret
800
Tax va I ue of
Depreciation
A II oltlances· 353
378
384
.------~ --
(I n do I l ar s.) ..._~.~-,----· De_p.I.~ciat ion
~;_ *At a tax rate of 48 percent.
So-,,~' p" hma n, Jo s cp h A., f:_gde<:.'.L-T,'."_1'.Q.'-'Y> "" 51'; n gt 00, D.C.,
The Brool<ings Institution, 1971, p.125.
I i ty
TI-\BLE VIII
I nd e x 0 f l'1il n u fa c t u I' i n 9 Cap a cit y and Rei at ion 0 f 0 u t put to
Capacity: 1950 to 1975~--------------
R e_1 a t i_.9_~ _ _9_~ u t toe a pac i !_y__lf!..~:rs~'lU
I nd ex of
Year __Ca pa c I__!_Y._
1950 50
1955 64
1960 79
1965 IOU
1968 121
1969 128
1970 135
1971 140
1972 145
1973 151
1974-pr-el. lSI
1975,lst
qtr-
PI' e I • 161
Primar-y Ac1va reed
~ Ma !:!.!:lJ a c\:J:lr___l_r1_9.Process i nJi £,rocess i r~
92 98 89
90 94 88
80 79 80
89 91 88
88 81 88
87 89 85
78 82 76
75 79 7J
79 85 75
83 90 79
79 84
76
68 69
68
Note: 1967output=100. Annual figures are averages of quarterly data.
Source: Board of Gover-nors of HlP 'edel-a I F~eser-ve System, [_e_dera I Reser-ve
!?_~Oet in. Ju I y 1967, and Ca pa C;JJ:_Y_~@ za tj_g_n~_l'1a nu fa ct ur i n_g_(E.5.) ,
quarterly; U. S. Bureau of the Census, StiJtistic'!_! __t~__tJ1.!I_act of tile
United States: 1975, p , 732. -----
CH/\RT
Effect of 7 Pel-cent Investment Credit and Double Declining--Elalance
Depreciation on Ra t e of Return of Te n->, Fifteen-, and Twenty-Year
/vs s et s Yielding 10 Percent \'iith Strilight-Line Depreciation.* _
Rate of return (percent)
,S .---------~---------------.-.-.--..-.--.....- .-...-..-..-.-.-..--- ..--..-.-.--.-._.·-·--····--·--··--··---·--·1
B
Life of asset (years)
13
l i Ly
life of asset.
I~o t e : f I r
eceipts during*Assuming a constilnt stream o· annua
A=StriJight-1 ine depreciatilJn. Investment
i3=Striligllt-line depreci,Jtioll pius.! percent I ercent
Ccc[)ouble-[Jc'clining-brll,:Jnce eJ('precldtlon pius p e
credit.
credit.
investrnont
"'i1)shington, U.C.,
Tax Pol.!.5-'L,
1971, p.129.
Pechman, Joseph A., Federal
The llrookings Institution,

•
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